Subject: Serious Concerns Regarding 0850 532 10 42, “Nethas”, Combined Backend Tracking and Possible Misuse of Meta‑Related Data – Request for Clarification and InvestigationDear Meta team,I am writing to raise serious concerns about the phone number 0850 532 10 42, the company behind it (commonly referred to as “Nethas Bilgisayar Bilişim … A.Ş. (Nethas Teknoloji)”), and the possibility that my data and the data of other users may be profiled and targeted through a combined backend infrastructure that also involves Meta’s services in Türkiye.According to information from public sources and user complaints, the number 0850 532 10 42 does not belong to one of the main mobile operators in Türkiye (Turkcell, Vodafone, Türk Telekom, etc.), but appears to be registered to a private technology company based in Bodrum, Muğla, called Nethas. There is also a striking similarity between the trade name “Nethas” and “Netaş”, which is a well‑known and long‑established Turkish information and communication technologies company founded in 1967 to build the country’s telecom infrastructure. Because of this similarity in spelling and pronunciation, there is a real risk that ordinary users and even some institutions may mistakenly associate “Nethas” with “Netaş”, or assume an official connection between them, which could create an undeserved sense of trust.Public complaint platforms show that 0850 532 10 42 has called many people, often repeatedly, frequently without clear identification or explanation of the true purpose of the call. Most people describe these calls as if they were ordinary “internet / 5G / package sales” or marketing calls. Because of this, they do not see them as a security risk and do not consider that there could be a more complex or organized structure behind them. They simply think “someone is trying to sell me internet,” and therefore do not realize they might actually be targets of something more serious.Online complaint sites only display nicknames and short texts, so it is impossible for the public to know who exactly has been called, what their background is, or what may have happened to them afterwards. Even if one of these people later became a victim of fraud, account takeover, identity theft, physical assault or other serious harm, it would be extremely difficult for an ordinary citizen to connect that harm back to these calls.Because of this, I suspect that the real purpose of the calls from 0850 532 10 42 may not be to sell internet service at all, but rather to scan and select potential victims and to collect background information about them. The appearance of a “marketing call” lowers people’s guard and may help hide more serious activities behind an innocent façade.In modern smartphone‑based systems, mobile phone numbers are often tightly linked with device identifiers and various sensors (GPS, Bluetooth, Wi‑Fi, accelerometer, microphone, etc.), and this was clearly visible during the COVID‑19 period with contact‑tracing apps. In Türkiye, for example, the HES (Hayat Eve Sığar) code system used mobile applications and phone numbers to manage health and mobility data during the pandemic. Because such infrastructures technically allow location and movement patterns to be derived from smartphone sensors, there is an inherent privacy risk when private call‑center numbers and unknown third parties interact with users through the same phone numbers that are, or were, tied to state‑backed systems. For this reason, I respectfully request that the competent authorities also verify whether the number 0850 532 10 42 has ever been associated, directly or indirectly, with HES‑related or similar government‑integrated platforms, or used in any way to obtain or correlate personal health, location or identity data without proper authorization. I do not have direct proof of such misuse; this request is made purely as a precaution, based on the general data‑linkage risks documented in the scientific and legal literature on COVID‑19 mobile sensing and contact‑tracing apps.In Türkiye, Meta Platforms Inc. operates through its local representative (often referred to as “Meta Turkey”, including entities such as Madoka Turkey Bilişim). I do not have direct evidence of any formal relationship between this structure and the company behind 0850 532 10 42. However, if such a relationship or indirect cooperation exists, then the repeated calls made from this number could be part of a wider ecosystem in which phone calls, their costs, their timing and their stated purposes are influenced by, or correlated with, users’ online activity on Meta platforms – including what they search, view and write on Facebook, Instagram, WhatsApp or related services. For this reason, I respectfully ask Meta to clarify whether any data about my online behaviour (posts, messages, searches, viewing history, metadata) has been shared, directly or indirectly, with the entity using 0850 532 10 42, and whether these calls were in any way targeted or priced on the basis of such data.In addition, I would like to underline that a number of critical infrastructures in Türkiye generate large amounts of backend data that, if misused, could be combined with Meta‑related data and 0850 calls. Gas‑leak detection systems and sensors at fuel stations, for example, are designed to monitor combustible gases and vapours in the air for safety purposes. ATM back‑end systems likewise handle detailed information such as card identifiers, location, time and transaction amounts. During the COVID‑19 period, the HES code infrastructure collected and processed phone numbers, device identifiers, location and health‑related status.From a technical perspective, if campaign infrastructure providers or other private companies were able to access or correlate data from such systems – even indirectly – they could, in theory, build very detailed movement and behaviour profiles of citizens based on where they refuel, which ATMs they use and what their health or travel status is. These profiles could then be linked to 0850‑series phone calls that appear to offer “5G promotions” or “internet packages”, while in reality being used to target specific individuals who have been flagged as suitable “victims” by a combined backend profiling system. At this stage I do not have direct evidence that any particular company has unlawful access to gas‑sensor systems, ATM back‑ends or the HES infrastructure; however, I respectfully request that the relevant authorities, and Meta where applicable, examine whether there is any illegal data‑sharing or technical integration between these infrastructures, campaign/call‑centre providers and entities making calls from 0850 numbers.Furthermore, I am concerned about the role of outsourced campaign and CRM providers that serve fuel stations, supermarket chains, municipalities and other brands in Türkiye. Many loyalty programmes, discount campaigns, free Wi‑Fi logins and mobile‑app registrations are technically operated not by the brand itself, but by third‑party technology companies (similar to Nethas) that run the SMS, CRM and automation backends. Because one such provider can serve multiple brands at the same time, it is technically possible for them to merge phone numbers and timestamps from different campaigns into a single internal database. If this is done without explicit consent and proper legal basis, it amounts to a serious violation of data‑protection rules, yet users see only “campaign messages” or “marketing calls” and cannot detect what is happening behind the scenes.For example, I personally passed through the city of Bolu only once on my way back from Ankara, stopping briefly for a drink, yet from that time on I have regularly received SMS messages and notifications in the name of Bolu Municipality. This suggests that even one‑time physical visits can be turned into long‑term profiling through such infrastructures. In a similar way, citizens who once use a particular fuel station or supermarket and then repeatedly receive calls and messages from related numbers (including 0850 numbers) may in fact be experiencing the effects of a combined backend data pool operated by campaign providers.In light of all of the above, I kindly request that Meta:Clarify whether any of my Facebook / Instagram / WhatsApp data (including metadata, behavioural data and profile information) has ever been shared, directly or indirectly, with the company behind 0850 532 10 42 or with any third party that may be cooperating with it.Confirm whether any ads, recommendations, call‑to‑action campaigns or other targeting mechanisms on Meta platforms have been configured in a way that could lead to, or support, outbound phone calls from 0850 532 10 42 (or similar 0850 numbers) to me or to other users.Confirm whether Meta Turkey (or any other local representative in Türkiye) has any contractual, technical or commercial relationship with the company operating 0850 532 10 42 (Nethas Bilgisayar Bilişim / Nethas Teknoloji), beyond the ordinary self‑service advertising tools that any advertiser can use.Provide a clear explanation of what categories of my personal data are processed for advertising and targeting in Türkiye, and with which categories of third parties such data may be shared – in particular, whether any data is shared with call‑centre operators, campaign infrastructure providers or 0850‑series number operators.Where appropriate, cooperate with the competent national authorities in Türkiye (such as data‑protection, telecom and consumer‑protection regulators, as well as prosecutors) to help clarify whether combined backend profiling involving Meta‑related data and 0850 calls is taking place and, if so, to stop it.At this stage, I do not claim to have definitive proof that Meta, Meta Turkey or the company behind 0850 532 10 42 has committed a specific crime. My purpose is to formally record my concerns, to prevent possible abuse arising from data sharing and backend profiling, and to request that Meta and its local representative in Türkiye perform the necessary internal checks and, where appropriate, assist the relevant authorities in investigating these issues.Thank you for your attention to this matter.Sincerely,[Your full name][Country, city][E‑mail / phone][Date]