fehim yamak calgavThis text is not a forensic expert report, a crime-scene investigation report, a laboratory finding or a completed forensic technical analysis. During this discussion, publicly available publications and statements were reviewed; no independent examination was conducted of the original investigation file, raw device logs, the gas operator’s data from the time of the incidents or samples collected at the scenes. The purpose of this text is to bring together the information that could be verified, the limitations of the sources, possibilities that could be investigated and statements in earlier responses that require correction.
A news report, an official statement, an academic publication, a laboratory result and an expert report are not the same type of document. The appearance of information in a news report or an official statement does not mean that the original technical report has been read here or that its conclusions have been independently verified. At the same time, failure to locate a report in a search of publicly available material does not establish that no such report exists in an investigation or court file. When assessing a document’s evidential value, its purpose, methodology, underlying data and the limits of its conclusions should be considered, not merely its title.
The different incidents discussed here must be kept separate. The events of 20 November 2003 included the attacks on HSBC in Levent and the British Consulate General in Beyoğlu; the Beşiktaş attacks of 10 December 2016 were separate incidents (overview of the 2003 events, contemporary reporting on the 2016 events). The Reina incident was a shooting attack on 1 January 2017 and should not be treated as a bombing.[bbc]
The Beşiktaş stadium concerned entered service in April 2016 under the name Vodafone Arena (official Beşiktaş announcement). However, the stadium’s approved internal natural-gas installation plans for 2016 were not verified during this discussion. Consequently, no definitive information is being provided about which gas pipes, appliances or valves were present on particular floors. The fact that a facility is new or large should not, by itself, be treated as proof of a particular installation layout.
Publicly available sources on Beşiktaş 2016 include the range of 300–400 kg and the wording “up to 400 kilograms” (Amnesty International, CityNews). A report dated 14 December 2016, citing a statement by Istanbul Police Chief Mustafa Çalışkan, gives a figure of 400 kg and names RDX, TNT and PETN (Akşam). The news reports examined do not publish the original laboratory report, the method used to determine the quantity or the uncertainty of the calculation (CityNews, Akşam). These are therefore publicly reported quantities, not quantities independently measured in this review.
The certainty previously attached to the 700 kg figure for Levent must be corrected. The medical article published in 2008 discusses the HSBC and British Consulate General attacks together and reports that approximately 700 kg of an ammonium-based mixture was used “in these bombings”; it does not clearly distinguish whether the quantity refers to HSBC alone, each attack or the combined total (Turkish Journal of Emergency Medicine). The accessible publisher’s abstract of the cited 2005 study concerns hospital caseloads and resource use and does not explain how the quantity was established (Rodoplu and colleagues). Accordingly, this review has not verified the claim that “700 kg was conclusively measured at HSBC alone”; equally, it has not established that the figure is incorrect.
The assumption that the two incidents involved the same type of military TNT cannot be drawn from the sources examined: the secondary academic account concerning Levent and the official statement concerning Beşiktaş contain different material descriptions (Turkish Journal of Emergency Medicine, Akşam). Actual material mass, net explosive mass and TNT equivalent must also be distinguished; TNT equivalent is a comparative measure and does not establish that the material itself was TNT (European Commission Joint Research Centre).
Explosive quantity alone is insufficient to determine the pressure at a particular point or the overall damage; explosive properties, distance, surrounding structures, reflections, construction materials and the progression of damage all affect the outcome (FEMA). Similar peak pressures at particular points do not establish equal overall loading or damage; peak pressure and impulse are separate measures (European Commission Joint Research Centre). Consequently, the proposition that a specialist may perform a particular task more effectively cannot be converted into the general claim that “50 kg of the same explosive always produces a much greater effect than 700 kg.” The definite distance–pressure estimates previously given without scene measurements are withdrawn.
Controlled building demolition and blast pressure transmitted into the surrounding area are not the same measure. In demolition, explosives may initiate collapse, while the structure’s own weight and gravity play important roles in the subsequent destruction; the size of a collapsed building is therefore not a direct measure of explosive energy (explanation of building demolition physics). No verified comparative database of explosive quantity, pressure and destruction from military exercises, attacks in other countries or demolitions was created during this discussion, and no new estimate of explosive quantity was calculated.
The scope of the proposed gas-related inquiry requires particular clarification. The issue is not limited to an underground natural-gas main; it is whether the initial event could have damaged the stadium’s or a nearby building’s internal natural-gas installation and thereby contributed to a subsequent leak, fire or secondary explosion. Faults and leaks in gas installations can create fire and explosion hazards, but the presence of gas pipes in a building is not evidence that a secondary explosion occurred. The use of explosives in an initial event and the occurrence of a subsequent gas-related event are logically separate questions, each requiring its own evidence.[hse.gov]
An investigated example shows that a natural-gas explosion inside a building can have serious structural consequences: the NTSB report on the Youngstown incident of 28 May 2024 documents an explosion caused by a natural-gas release in a 13-storey building, significant structural damage and subsequent demolition. This example demonstrates the general possibility; it does not show that the same mechanism occurred in Beşiktaş or Levent. The cause of an incident should not be determined solely from the number of floors or visible damage.[ntsb]
Seismic gas-shutoff systems, combination boilers and gas detectors should not be conflated. The Chamber of Mechanical Engineers distinguishes mechanical seismic shutoff valves from systems using electronic sensors and solenoid valves; its explanation does not state that every valve has an internet connection or timestamped logging. Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality’s account of the 23 April 2025 earthquake states that some independent building valves closed even though the threshold for central gas shutoff was not exceeded; this is a recent example showing that the systems need not behave identically, not a record of the 2016 incident (AKOM). It should therefore not be assumed that every explosion automatically shuts off all gas flow or that every shutoff generates an electronic log.[mmo.org]
An official account states that İGDAŞ uses SCADA to monitor and remotely control network pressure, certain valve and station conditions and power outages (AKOM). That account does not establish that records from the times of Beşiktaş 2016 or Levent 2003 are retained today, how frequently they were recorded or whether they would show every event in a particular building’s internal installation (AKOM). The proposed inquiry should therefore ask not only about network data but also about any available internal gas and fire alarms, building-management systems, gas-shutoff records, maintenance, repairs and emergency-response records.
A payment-card POS terminal and a post-mix dispenser that serves drinks into a cup are different devices. Connected beverage dispensers can indeed have data and diagnostic capabilities: the Coca-Cola Freestyle 9100 specification describes connectivity, on-board diagnostics, alerts and cartridge-level displays, while Cornelius describes cloud-based remote diagnostics and performance monitoring (Coca-Cola technical specification, Cornelius). However, these documents do not establish that the same systems were installed at a particular business in Beşiktaş or Ortaköy in 2016, or that data from the incidents are retained today.
The categorical generalisations about machine capabilities in earlier responses must therefore be corrected: it cannot be said either that all models lack recording capabilities or that every model records taste and mixing data. The particular flow, dosing, temperature, pressure, product-depletion or fault information measured and retained must be verified for the relevant model and installation. The manufacturer documents examined do not establish a capability to record ambient blast pressure or product taste directly (Coca-Cola technical specification, Cornelius).
The presence of a pressure gauge or electronic pressure sensor in a machine’s CO₂ line does not establish that it has a measurement system capable of recording a blast wave in the surrounding air. Because the sensor type, sampling rate, calibration and raw data of a particular machine were not examined in this discussion, statements such as “the blast pressure was definitely recorded,” “it could not be affected under any circumstances” or “the drink’s taste definitely changed even without damage” cannot be accepted as verified conclusions. The definite percentage, duration and taste-change calculations given in earlier responses should not be used as established findings about these incidents.
Connected cooler-tracking products that use accelerometers do exist; for example, the Vision IoT product examined states that it can monitor movement, temperature and door status (Vision IoT). However, that product page does not establish that raw acceleration waveforms are recorded or that the product was used in Beşiktaş or Ortaköy in 2016 (Vision IoT). The investigable question is therefore whether a particular device had such a module at the time and, if so, what data remain; the fact that a device shook does not automatically establish the number or cause of explosions.
It is proposed that any available records of power loss, restarts, connectivity, movement, doors, gas or water supply and faults be compared with other evidence. However, the last communication time should not be treated as the exact second of the physical event; device clocks, server clocks, communication delays, recording frequency and gaps in the data require separate examination. Several devices losing connectivity is not, by itself, evidence of an additional explosion, and door-opening or drink-dispensing counts should not be presented directly as the number of people present.
POS, cash-register and payment records could be examined to investigate activity before the incidents and identify potential witnesses. However, the last payment time does not by itself establish the exact time of an explosion, and a card’s registered holder should not be assumed, without further verification, to have been the person at the scene. It is recommended that the relevant authorities determine the scope of requests for bank and business records and that personal data not be openly distributed to supporter groups.
The Banking Regulation and Supervision Agency explains a ten-year retention obligation under Law No. 5411 for certain documents relating to banks’ operations; this does not state that all technical POS and network logs are retained for the same period or that deletion is mandatory immediately after ten years (BDDK). Accordingly, categorical statements in earlier responses such as “December 2026 or January 2027 is the definite final deadline,” “the 2003 records were definitely deleted in 2013” or “bank records are the only remaining source” should not be used. Record type, applicable retention requirements, archive practices and copies previously placed in case files should be investigated separately.
For the kumpir, or baked-potato, shops and other businesses around Reina, this discussion did not verify which establishments were open at the relevant time, which equipment makes and models they used, whether they had cloud connections or whether their records entered a case file. Nor was it established here that the attacker passed a particular stall or made a purchase there. An inquiry into records from these businesses may be proposed, but in view of Reina’s nature as a shooting attack, inferences based on blast pressure should not be transferred to that incident.[bbc]
A scientific seismic study of the Beşiktaş events was published in 2018; it uses broadband seismometer records from the ISK and KAVV stations and appears as a journal article, not as a court expert report (Livaoğlu and colleagues). The publication also contains inconsistencies in dates and time intervals: the narrative gives 2016 and 45 seconds, while a table gives 2017, and the narrative and tables contain differing time intervals (the same publication). These discrepancies require clarification; they are not, by themselves, evidence of an additional explosion, concealment or wrongful attribution. Raw seismic records were not reanalysed in this discussion, the existence of a separate microbarometer recording was not verified and no precise source time was calculated.
Identifying explosive residue and determining the original explosive mass are different questions; the ENFSI guidance distinguishes the scope of trace analysis, contamination risks and the limits of interpretation (ENFSI). Earlier responses were overly definite in suggesting that particular chemical results were present in the case file or that a single residue finding eliminated all alternatives. Without reading the original reports, no definitive conclusion should be drawn about sample results, quantity or the exclusion of a secondary event.
Photographs and measurements of damaged structures and equipment can also be examined by specialists; NIJ-supported research seeks to develop three-dimensional documentation and assessment methods that treat structural and non-structural components as physical witnesses to an explosion (NIJ). However, a single broken pane, bent metal panel or damaged device cannot by itself establish an exact explosive quantity or source location; the assessment must consider the surrounding environment and structural conditions (FEMA).
The proposed review should consider together the original reports underlying the publicly announced quantities; whether the measure is actual mass or TNT equivalent; uncertainties; sample and damage documentation; any available raw audio and seismic records; gas-network and internal building alarm records; gas-shutoff and emergency-response reports; equipment inventories; and existing business and service records. For every record, its existence, the system’s capabilities at the relevant time, timing information, integrity and retention status should be established separately. A response that “no record exists” should be clarified to determine whether the information was never generated, was deleted, passed its retention period or was preserved in another file.
For supporters and witnesses, the recommendation is to preserve original photographs and videos, record observations separately from interpretation with their location and time, and submit them to the competent authorities through appropriate channels. Suspicious objects or installations should not be interfered with, and businesses, technicians or individuals should not be accused solely because a service record or a device exists. A small record may contribute to an investigation, but its existence does not mean that it automatically proves a particular allegation.
In conclusion, this discussion has not established that a secondary natural-gas explosion occurred, that the publicly announced explosive quantities were incorrect, that particular beverage machines recorded the explosions or that an additional event was concealed. What has been developed is a research proposal to examine the original technical foundations of public statements and, where available, have specialists assess independent records together. The importance of small clues is not being dismissed; leads, possibilities, findings and verified conclusions are being kept distinct.
İsterseniz bu İngilizce metne kısa bir başvuru üst yazısı da hazırlayabilirim.
