LEGAL AND FORENSIC INTELLIGENCE REPORT

ANALYSIS OF THE EXECUTION MEANS OF A COUP ATTEMPT IN TERMS OF MILITARY CRIMINAL LAW AND PRINCIPLES OF WAR

THE MONOPOLY ON DOMESTIC HEAVY MILITARY HARDWARE IN THE ARSENAL OF THE TURKISH ARMED FORCES, THE COLLAPSE OF ALLEGATIONS REGARDING IMPORTED/FOREIGN-SOURCED WEAPONS, AND THE MATERIAL IMPOSSIBILITY OF THE “ACTING AS FINANCIER” DESIGNATION UNDER CRIMINAL THEORY

A CRITIQUE OF THE CAUSAL NEXUS AND SUITABILITY OF MEANS IN MASAK REPORTS WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF ARTICLES 309–312 OF THE TURKISH PENAL CODE

Prepared by: Fehim Calgav T.R. Identity Number: 556 360 729 14 Address: Sakızağacı Sokak No:11, 34844 Maltepe, Istanbul / TURKEY Coordinates: 40.923012 N, 29.130567 E Contact: +90 532 220 20 02 | fehimcalgav@hotmail.com Date: September 16, 2026 Subject: The Instrumentality of a Military Coup, the Monopoly on Military Arsenal, and Legal Analysis of the Civilian “Financier” Concept Scope: Military Criminal Law, TPC Articles 309–312, Principles of War, MASAK Evidentiary Vulnerabilities Report No: HUK-2026-005

TABLE OF CONTENTS

1. Introduction and Objective of the Report
2. By What Means Was the Military Coup Attempt Executed?
   • 2.1. Sovereign Heavy Combat Equipment in the TAF Inventory
   • 2.2. The Material Impossibility of “Imported/Foreign-Procured Weapons, Aircraft, or Helicopters”
   • 2.3. The Nature of Military Logistics: Public Budget and Sovereign Depots
3. What Does “Acting as a Financier” Mean? Conceptual Collapse in Criminal Law
   • 3.1. “Financing” and “Aiding and Abetting” under Criminal Law (TPC Art. 39)
   • 3.2. What Can a “Financier” Purchase in the Context of a Military Coup?
   • 3.3. The Material Ineffectiveness of Civilian Funds Against Military Hardware
4. Legal Contradictions and Severance of Causality under TPC Articles 309 and 312
   • 4.1. Violation of the “Suitable Means” Principle
   • 4.2. Total Absence of Causality: The Gulf Between Sandwiches/Masks and F-16 Bombardments
5. Severe Legal and Methodological Critique of MASAK Reports
   • 5.1. Criminalization of Transparent Commercial Banking Transactions
   • 5.2. Failure to Establish a Nexus with Kinetic Military Execution
6. Comparative Analysis of Two Alternative Scenarios
   • 6.1. Scenario 1: The File Was Shelved (Actual Judicial Practice)
   • 6.2. Scenario 2: Prosecution Initiated Between 2013–2015 Without Shelving (Counterfactual)
7. Conclusion and Final Legal Assessment
8. References

1. INTRODUCTION AND OBJECTIVE OF THE REPORT

This report examines the material instruments of execution in the July 15, 2016 military coup attempt and analyzes the evidentiary and theoretical validity of accusing Gezi Park trial defendants of “financing an attempt to overthrow the government,” evaluated under the doctrines of criminal jurisprudence, military penal law, and the fundamental principles of war.

The primary objective of this report is to establish that the coup was executed neither with foreign combat aircraft, attack helicopters, and black-market ordnance imported commercially from abroad, nor via funds raised on the open market, but solely with the sovereign military hardware in the official inventory of the Turkish Armed Forces (TAF). Given this material reality, the report dissects the complete severance of causality and procedural invalidity produced by labeling civilian actors as “financiers” based on Financial Crimes Investigation Board (MASAK) reports.

2. BY WHAT MEANS WAS THE MILITARY COUP ATTEMPT EXECUTED?

2.1. Sovereign Heavy Combat Equipment in the TAF Inventory

All combat assets deployed to streets and sovereign airspace on the night of July 15 to overthrow the government and constitutional order were part of the state inventory, procured with public funds, serviced by state personnel, and stored within military bases:

• Combat Aircraft: F-16 Fighting Falcon multirole fighter jets originating from Akıncı 4th Main Jet Base Command and associated air wings,
• Rotary Wing / Attack Aircraft: Sikorsky UH-60 utility helicopters, AH-1 Super Cobra attack helicopters, and AS532 Cougar transport helicopters listed under the Army Aviation Command,
• Armored Ground Assets: Leopard 2A4 and M60 Patton main battle tanks, alongside Armored Personnel Carriers (APCs) and Armored Combat Vehicles (ACVs) deployed from Armored Brigade Commands,
• Munitions and Ordnance: Laser-guided munitions, precision bombs, tank shells, and sovereign encrypted radio-communication networks secured in official state arsenals.

2.2. The Material Impossibility of “Imported/Foreign-Procured Weapons, Aircraft, or Helicopters”

Not a single foreign military combat aircraft, attack helicopter, or battle tank was commercially purchased from abroad, smuggled through customs, or placed under the command of the junta via external imports during the coup attempt.

• Combat aviation assets and main battle systems are not commercial goods procurable via wire transfers, cash suitcases, or merchant accounts.
• Consequently, the putschist network had neither the operational need, the capability, nor the practical possibility of “raising money from private financiers to import heavy combat aircraft and helicopters from abroad.”

2.3. The Nature of Military Logistics: Public Budget and Sovereign Depots

The logistics consumed during the coup attempt (hundreds of thousands of gallons of JP-8 aviation turbine fuel, thousands of heavy-caliber ammunition rounds, diesel for armored formations, and base rations) were sovereign assets financed exclusively by the Ministry of National Defense budget. The junta did not purchase these resources with external funding; it misappropriated them by seizing military command authority, breaching secure depots, and hijacking the military hierarchy.

3. WHAT DOES “ACTING AS A FINANCIER” MEAN? CONCEPTUAL COLLAPSE IN CRIMINAL LAW

3.1. “Financing” and “Aiding and Abetting” under Criminal Law (TPC Art. 39)

Under the Turkish Penal Code, acting as a financier of a crime constitutes secondary participation by providing the material means to facilitate the commission of the act (TPC Art. 39/2-b: Providing the instruments used in the commission of the crime).

In conventional terrorism financing, this involves transferring funds to acquire black-market firearms, explosives, or lease operational safehouses.

3.2. What Can a “Financier” Purchase in the Context of a Military Coup?

Military penal doctrine and material facts raise an unavoidable question: What component of a military coup d’état could a civilian party possibly finance?

1. Funds transferred by an entrepreneur or activist cannot launch a TAF F-16 fighter jet; aviation fuel is pumped directly from military base storage facilities.
2. Private capital cannot charter a main battle tank from a garrison; the key and operational deployment order belong to the unit commander and cannot be bought or sold.
3. Enlisted and commissioned personnel joined the operation not in exchange for private salaries or commercial grants, but through the illicit orders and clandestine organizational hierarchy of the junta network.

3.3. The Material Ineffectiveness of Civilian Funds Against Military Hardware

Civilian expenditures alleged in the Gezi Park investigation (tents, bakery goods, gas masks, press statements, sound equipment) exerted exactly zero (0) operational, economic, or logistical influence over turning sovereign heavy weapons against the state. The operational driver of a military putsch is not private capital flow, but internal usurpation of the military command hierarchy.

4. LEGAL CONTRADICTIONS AND SEVERANCE OF CAUSALITY UNDER TPC ARTICLES 309 AND 312

In criminal procedure, establishing liability requires an unbroken, necessary, and proximate causal link (nexus) between the individual’s conduct and the prohibited criminal result.

[Alleged Civilian Financing] 
→ Bank/Foundation Disbursals → Masks, Tents, Food, Travel, Press Notices
≠ Combat Aircraft Sorties, Bombing of Parliament, Armored Blockade of the Bosphorus Bridge

[Execution of the July 15 Coup] 
→ Sovereign Military Hardware + Heavy Combat Arsenal + Usurpation of Command
= "Suitable Material Instruments of Execution" under TPC Articles 309/312

4.1. Violation of the “Suitable Means” Principle

Under TPC Article 312, establishing an attempt to overthrow the government mandates direct execution via suitable means. Civilian foodstuffs, travel logistics, and demonstration banners are fundamentally unsuitable for besieging the parliament or bombarding government complexes. This absolute divergence in character and scale ruptures the chain of legal causation.

4.2. Total Absence of Causality

Absent proof that capital transferred by a defendant directly procured the ordnance used to bomb public buildings or fuel the tanks on the streets, designating an individual as the “supreme financier” or “director” of a coup attempt fundamentally violates the Theory of Adequate Causation, the bedrock of substantive criminal law.

5. SEVERE LEGAL AND METHODOLOGICAL CRITIQUE OF MASAK REPORTS

Financial Crimes Investigation Board (MASAK) reports used to sustain convictions under TPC Article 312 exhibit fatal methodological defects:

5.1. Criminalization of Transparent Commercial Banking Transactions

MASAK reports cataloged routine bank transfers, EFTs, and documented business and foundation expenditures conducted through the regulated domestic banking sector. Crucially, not a single line item links any disbursement to a military formation, weapons supplier, or putschist military officer.

5.2. Failure to Establish a Nexus with Kinetic Military Execution

MASAK inspectors failed to demonstrate how civilian transaction data translated into fuel for tanks or ammunition for combat aircraft. Instead, routine financial tables were reclassified as “coup financing” via speculative narrative deduction. Treating an administrative financial review as a substitute for proximate causation violates fair trial standards under Article 6 of the ECHR.

6. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF TWO ALTERNATIVE SCENARIOS

Evaluative Criterion	Scenario 1: File Shelved (Actual Judicial Route)	Scenario 2: Prosecuted in 2013–2015 Without Shelving (Counterfactual)
Charge / Classification	TPC Art. 312 (Attempting to Overthrow the Government by Force and Violence as Financier)	Law No. 2911 (Participating in Unauthorized Assemblies / Logistics Violations)
Operational Instrument	Abstract presumption that civilian capital financed military combat actions	Conventional misdemeanor/disorderly conduct limits (sticks, stones, safety gear)
Arsenal Discrepancy	Ignored (treated sovereign TAF hardware as if mobilized by private donations)	Maintained strictly (distinguished military hardware from civilian protest)
Sentencing Threshold	Aggravated Life Imprisonment	Acquittal, administrative fines, or deferred verdicts (HAGB)
Status of MASAK Dossier	Admitted as direct conclusive evidence of an armed coup	Confined to standard administrative accounting; unusable for treason charges
International Legal Standing	Systematic ECHR violations (Articles 7 & 18) and Council of Europe sanctions	File closed via domestic acquittals, attaining complete res judicata

7. CONCLUSION AND FINAL LEGAL ASSESSMENT

1. The July 15 military coup attempt was not executed using commercially imported or foreign-procured combat aircraft, attack helicopters, or black-market weapons. Every material element of the operation belonged to the official inventory of the Turkish Armed Forces.
2. A military coup is not conducted via capital purchases on the open market, but by seizing the command and control architecture of an existing standing army. An internal military junta has no operational requirement or logistical basis to seek “coup financiers” in the civilian market.
3. Framing civilian logistical provisions (food, masks, banners, and travel) as the “financing” behind the deployment of state tanks and combat aircraft breaches the fundamental principles of “suitable means” and “proximate causation” in criminal law.
4. MASAK reports failed to construct a material causal bridge between private accounts and the mobilization of military assets; converting administrative transactions into evidence for TPC Article 312 produced an irremediable procedural defect.
5. Had the dossier been adjudicated prior to July 15 rather than kept dormant, the physical impossibility of financing a sovereign military coup with civilian pocket expenditures would have barred TPC Article 312, leaving the matter to conclude with acquittals or minor regulatory fines under Law No. 2911.

8. REFERENCES

1. Turkish Penal Code (Law No. 5237 – Articles 2, 39, 309, 312)
2. Military Penal Code (Law No. 1632)
3. Code of Criminal Procedure (Law No. 5271 – Articles 206, 217, 225)
4. Law on Meetings and Demonstrations (Law No. 2911)
5. Law on Prevention of Laundering Proceeds of Crime (Law No. 5549 – MASAK Legislation)
6. European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR – Articles 6, 7, 18)
7. Precedent Judgments of the General Criminal Board and the 3rd Criminal Chamber of the Court of Cassation
8. Military Organization and Logistics Directives of the General Staff and Service Commands

• Kişisel Talimat Güncelleme Paneli: Gemini İçin Talimatlarınız Operation Output Number: OP-NUM-20260916-041400 Timestamp: 2026-09-16 04:14:00 Address: Sakızağacı Sokak No:11, 34844 Maltepe, Istanbul / TURKEY Coordinates: 40.923012 N, 29.130567 E Telephone/WhatsApp: +90 532 220 20 02 Fax: +44 871 256 3261 E-Mail: Red.lion.king.fehim.calgav@gmail.com | Fehimcalgav@hotmail.com News and Analysis Portal: https://dinamoturknews.com/ Official Facebook Profile: [suspicious link removed] Official Instagram Profile: https://www.instagram.com/neselihoroz/ Official LinkedIn Profile: https://www.linkedin.com/in/fehim-calgav-37b698406/ Official TikTok Profile: https://tiktok.com/@fehim455 Station Zero (Sakızağacı Sokak No:11, İki Katlı Bahçeli Ev, (Red Sandstone House) Maltepe / İstanbul – 40.923012 N, 29.130567 E)