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OPEN APPEAL TO THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY

On State Sovereignty, Arms Trade, and the Illegality of Providing Heavy Weapons to Private Companies

Esteemed Heads of State,
Honourable Ministers of Defence and Foreign Affairs,
Senior Defence Industry and Export Authorities,
Judges of the International Court of Justice,
Representatives of the United Nations and relevant international organisations,

The production, transfer and use of heavy weapons is not merely a commercial activity. This field lies at the very heart of state sovereignty, international peace and the shared security of humanity. Yet today, around fighter aircraft, tanks, heavy artillery systems, high‑destructive missiles and armoured units, an extremely dangerous practice has emerged, conducted through private companies, so‑called “private military organisations” and front commercial structures.

In this practice, three types of actors – which should in fact be strictly distinct – are deliberately blurred together:

1. Private arms‑producing companies (the industrial manufacturers),
2. Sovereign States and their regular armies (the end users),
3. Private companies, private military companies and front entities attempting to buy weapons (intermediaries, suppliers, proxy armies).

The distinction between these three roles is, both logically and legally, extremely clear. However, certain States and companies, whenever it suits their interests, disregard and distort this distinction, creating mechanisms that appear lawful on paper but produce the exact opposite outcomes in practice.

From this point, I address the international community – and in particular those States that produce and export heavy weapons – with direct and unequivocal questions:

• How is it that you are able to provide heavy weapons to a private company?
• When you deliver tanks, artillery, missiles, attack helicopters and heavy armoured vehicles to these companies, do you not ask: “Who are you? On whose behalf are you requesting these weapons?”
• Under what legal understanding do you effectively transfer the use of lethal force – a core element of State sovereignty – to profit‑seeking private companies?

Today’s picture reveals a three‑fold chain of shared responsibility:

• The private company that acquires the weapons is culpable.
  Any private entity which, without acting on behalf of a sovereign State, attempts to acquire, stockpile and transfer heavy weapons as a commercial legal person, by definition enters the realm of arms trafficking and usurpation of sovereign authority.
• The private manufacturing companies that supply such weapons are also responsible.
  Manufacturers who knowingly conceal the identity of the true end‑user, or who direct weapons to non‑State actors through false or misleading declarations, cannot escape responsibility by saying “we only produce” or “we only trade”.
• The States and governments that authorise these transfers are likewise responsible.
  Governments that sign export licences, approve end‑user certificates, and yet turn a blind eye while these weapons are deployed on the ground via private military companies and front entities, are co‑responsible for human rights violations, war crimes and arms trafficking.

In this context, States with a major share in the arms industry, leading defence exporters, and those granting broad room for manoeuvre to private military companies – first and foremost the Government of the United Kingdom and its Ministry of Defence – must honestly examine their own roles. The same questions apply to the United States, Russia and other major arms‑exporting States:

While declaring that sovereign authority is non‑transferable, why do you in practice transfer the use of heavy weapons to private military companies?
Do you apply international law only on paper, or do you have the courage to take into account the actual user on the ground?

At this point, three core principles must be clearly articulated:

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I. State Sovereignty and the Monopoly of Force

The authority to use lethal force through heavy weapons belongs solely to the sovereign State and its regular armed forces. This authority includes:

• Deciding to wage war,
• Conducting armed operations,
• Taking decisions on the use of lethal force,

and is non‑transferable. Once a State begins to delegate this authority in practice to a private company, it fragments its sovereignty and shares it with that company. This is contrary both to the foundations of public law theory and to the spirit of international law.

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II. The Distinction Between the Three Actors: Manufacturer – State – Company

1. Manufacturing Companies:
   These are private entities that design and produce tanks, armoured vehicles, missiles, air defence systems, attack helicopters, UAVs and similar weapon systems. Their legitimate role is to sell only to authorised State institutions in compliance with national and international export control regimes. A manufacturer that knowingly conceals or misrepresents the true end‑user ceases to be a mere industrial actor and becomes part of a criminal chain.
2. State / Regular Army (End User):
   This is the sovereign actor that brings heavy weapons into its inventory, trains its personnel and uses these weapons in practice. It is the primary addressee of international humanitarian law and human rights obligations. A State cannot legitimately claim: “I bought these weapons but I have handed their use over to a private company; I bear no responsibility.” Any entity that uses heavy weapons on behalf of the State, whether a regular army or a private company, ultimately falls within the State’s sphere of responsibility.
3. Private Companies / Private Military Companies (PMCs, Front Entities) Attempting to Purchase Weapons:
   This text does not target the carrying of light weapons within the framework of ordinary private security activities. It specifically targets the acquisition, stockpiling and use of heavy weapons (tanks, artillery, missiles, attack helicopters, heavy armoured vehicles, etc.) by private companies.

• When a private company attempts to acquire such heavy weapons for its own inventory,
• Or when it assumes the role of “de facto buyer” or “front end‑user” on behalf of another State’s army or an armed group, it is, by definition, engaged in arms trafficking, illicit procurement and usurpation of sovereign authority.

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III. Private Military Companies and Proxy War Models

Examples such as Blackwater/Academi and the Wagner Group have exposed a deeply troubling model:

• On official records these entities appear as “private security / service firms”;
• On the ground, they wield heavy weapons and act as proxy armies.

In this model:

• The manufacturer sells the heavy weapons on paper to a State.
• The State records those weapons in its inventory, yet allocates them in practice to a private military company in the field.
• The actual user – the one pulling the trigger, leading raids and planning attacks – is the private company.

Thus:

• The State attempts to dilute its political and legal responsibility by saying “the company did it”.
• The manufacturer averts its gaze from the factual user, claiming “we sold to a State”.
• The private company becomes a hybrid actor that exploits State power while trying to evade formal accountability.

This structure systematically undermines international arms control regimes, human rights standards and the laws of war, preserving them only on paper while violating them in practice.

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IV. Normative Demand: The Necessary Legal and Ethical Threshold

The mere existence and prevalence of a practice – namely, proxy wars conducted through private military companies – does not make it legitimate. The position expressed here is not a descriptive account of current reality, but a statement of the legal and moral standard that ought to apply.

Within this framework, the concrete appeal to the international community is as follows:

1. Formal Recognition of the End‑User Principle in Heavy Weapons
   End‑users of heavy weapons must be exclusively sovereign States and their regular armed forces. Recognising private persons or private companies as “end‑users” or “buyers” for such weapons should be explicitly deemed unlawful.
2. Prohibition on Providing Heavy Weapons to Private Companies
   Private military companies and commercial entities must be explicitly prohibited from directly acquiring, holding in inventory or transferring heavy systems such as tanks, artillery, missiles, attack helicopters, heavy armoured vehicles and multiple rocket launchers.
3. Joint Recognition of State and Corporate Responsibility
   If a private company cannot acquire heavy weapons without the authorisation and licensing of a State, then that State – as well as the manufacturing company that delivers the weapons – is co‑responsible for the consequences. No link in this chain may evade responsibility by claiming: “We did not know; we merely signed the papers.”
4. Mandatory Consistency Between Declared End‑User and Actual User
   In international arms trade, the true “end‑user” is not the name written on a form, but the actor who actually pulls the trigger on the ground. Whenever there is a discrepancy between the end‑user stated in documentation and the factual user, this must immediately trigger investigation and sanctions. Models in which the end‑user certificate names a State army yet a private army operates the weapons in the field must be explicitly prohibited.
5. Self‑Scrutiny by Major Exporting States
   States with powerful defence industries – first and foremost the United Kingdom – must conduct thorough investigations into the role of manufacturers and private military companies based on their territory in the transfer of heavy weapons to third countries. The defence that “we merely issued licences; what happened afterwards is not our concern” is not acceptable. A State that grants export licences must also bear its share of responsibility for serious violations that ensue.

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Final Word

State sovereignty is not a commodity to be subcontracted to companies.
The power to wage war is not a subject for commercial service contracts.
Heavy weapons must never become an ordinary item in a “client portfolio”.

I call upon the international community – especially those States and defence ministries that produce and export arms – to confront these realities. I call for a clear legal, political and moral rejection of the provision of heavy weapons to private companies, of proxy war models run through such companies, and of the de facto privatisation of sovereign authority.

If this line is not drawn clearly today, each new conflict will bring more war crimes, more civilian casualties and a deeper global crisis of trust for humanity as a whole.

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